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Abstract
Background: The 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa was the largest Ebola epidemic to date. Contact
tracing was a core surveillance activity. Challenges with paper-based contact tracing systems include incomplete
identification of contacts, delays in communication and response, loss of contact lists, inadequate data collection
and transcription errors.
The aim of this study was to design and evaluate an electronic system for tracing contacts of Ebola cases in Port
Loko District, Sierra Leone, and to compare this with the existing paper-based system. The electronic system
featured data capture using a smartphone application, linked to an alert system to notify the District Ebola
Response Centre of symptomatic contacts.
Methods: The intervention was a customised three-tier smartphone application developed using Dimagi’s
CommCare platform known as the Ebola Contact Tracing application (ECT app). Eligible study participants were all
26 Contact Tracing Coordinators (CTCs) and 86 Contact Tracers (CTs) working in the 11 Chiefdoms of Port Loko
District during the study period (April–August 2015). Case detection was from 13th April to 17th July 2015. The
CTCs and their CTs were provided with smartphones installed with the ECT app which was used to conduct
contact tracing activities. Completeness and timeliness of contact tracing using the app were compared with data
from April 13th-June 7th 2015, when the standard paper-based system was used.
Results: For 25 laboratory-confirmed cases for whom paper-based contact tracing was conducted, data for only 39%
of 408 contacts were returned to the District, and data were often incomplete. For 16 cases for whom app-based
contact tracing was conducted, 63% of 556 contacts were recorded as having been visited on the app, and the
median recorded duration from case confirmation to first contact visit was 70 h.
Conclusion: There were considerable challenges to conducting high-quality contact tracing in this setting using either
the paper-based or the app-based system. However, the study demonstrated that it was possible to implement mobile
health (mHealth) in this emergency setting. The app had the benefits of improved data completeness, storage and
accuracy, but the challenges of using an app in this setting and epidemic context were substantial.
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Background
The 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease (EVD) (Ebola) epi-
demic in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone resulted in
over 28,000 reported cases and over 11,000 deaths [1].
Sierra Leone was the most severely affected country,
with 8706 laboratory confirmed cases and 3956 deaths
[1]. During the epidemic, surveillance goals were to
detect Ebola cases promptly to provide an effective re-
sponse including rapid diagnosis, case isolation and
management, contact tracing, safe burials, and identifi-
cation of transmission chains [2, 3]. Contact tracing for
Ebola is defined as the identification and follow-up over
21 days of individuals who have been in contact with a
person confirmed to have been infected with Ebola [2].
Previous epidemics have been controlled through
contact tracing and isolation, which limits onward
transmission [4].
Contact tracing was a core surveillance activity in the
2014–2016 epidemic [5, 6]. Ebola contact tracing opera-
tions used paper-based systems supplemented by phone
calls and Short Message Service (SMS). Challenges identi-
fied in previous epidemics include incomplete identification
of contacts and inefficiencies in paper-based reporting
systems, including missing contact lists, inadequate data
collection and training, transcription errors and delays in
steps from identification of contacts to isolation of sus-
pected cases among those contacts [2, 5, 7–10].
The national system for contact tracing in Sierra
Leone during the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic was that,
after the initial alert of a suspected or probable case, a
case investigation team (CIT) investigated to deter-
mine whether the person was a suspected or probable
Ebola case. If the case definition was met, the CIT
conducted an initial line listing of contacts of the case.
The case (suspected or probable) was then escorted to
an Ebola Treatment Centre (ETC) or holding centre.
If laboratory-confirmed as EVD, contact tracing was
initiated, using a paper Daily Reporting Form (DRF).
Challenges specific to contact tracing during the
2014–2016 Ebola epidemic included insufficient
trained staff, community resistance to report Ebola
cases and contacts and mistrust of contact tracers,
limited telephone and internet connection, difficulties
in reaching remote areas and the high number of
Ebola cases that occurred within a short period [5, 9].
Due to these challenges, we established a study to as-
sess the ability of an mHealth app to improve contact
tracing through using mobile phones.
mHealth approaches for epidemic investigations
Use of mobile devices to support medical and public
health practice (mHealth) can improve health outcomes
in low-income settings [11–14], due to the low cost of
roll-out, mobility of devices, ease of use and flexible
deployment compared with other methods e.g. com-
puters. mHealth applications have the potential to reach
rural populations with low levels of income and literacy,
and to reduce time to collect data, distance travelled to
collect and return information and the cost of informa-
tion delivery [11, 12, 15, 16]. mHealth applications have
been used for epidemic tracking of tuberculosis (TB)
and Japanese encephalitis, but few mHealth applications
have been designed and evaluated for contact tracing.
One app designed for contact tracing for TB in
Botswana reduced the median time required to complete
the TB contact tracing form and improved data quality
compared to paper-based contact tracing [17]. However,
the full potential of mHealth in addressing disease epi-
demics is largely unexplored.
During the 2014–2016 Ebola epidemic, several mHealth
interventions were developed to improve patient care,
health worker safety, public awareness, surveillance and
vaccine monitoring [18–26]. Studies have reported on the
use of mobile phones for community event-based surveil-
lance through reporting of sick community members with
symptoms suggestive of Ebola to community and district
monitors through audio phone calls and SMS messages to
support surveillance initiatives [20, 27]. One of the few
apps for Ebola contact tracing was developed by the Earth
Institute at Columbia University. This consisted of a
smartphone application developed using the CommCare
application for collecting and analysing contact tracing
data in Guinea [10]. The system demonstrated the poten-
tial to improve data access and improve the quality of
surveillance data.
Evaluating mHealth interventions
Most studies of mHealth applications are small-scale or
pilot implementation studies, with few rigorously de-
signed evaluation studies [28–30]. This is likely due to
inherent challenges in introducing technologies in com-
plex emergencies, including the feasibility of implement-
ing technology during an ongoing epidemic [10] .
Objective
Our hypothesis was that the mHealth system would be
more effective for contact tracing than the standard
paper-based system. The original aims were to i)
evaluate the feasibility of introducing a smartphone-
based electronic data-capture and management system,
through the development of a smartphone app for
Ebola contact tracing and monitoring in Port Loko
District, Sierra Leone, and ii) compare the effectiveness
of the app with the standard paper-based system of
contact tracing through a cluster randomised trial. The
objectives were to i) assess the time between a new
Ebola case being laboratory-confirmed and their house-
hold contacts first being visited by a contact tracer, and
Danquah et al. BMC Infectious Diseases          (2019) 19:810 Page 2 of 12
ii) evaluate the operational requirements needed to
introduce effective mobile-based contact tracing and
monitoring in Sierra Leone.
Due to the decline in Ebola cases in Port Loko District
during the first 6 months of 2015, the study design was
changed on the June 8, 2015 to a proof-of-concept
(demonstration) project. The study aim was revised to
describe the feasibility and effectiveness of an electronic
data capture and management system to improve moni-
toring of contacts of confirmed Ebola cases, and to pro-
vide guidance on how best to implement the system.
The objectives remained unchanged.
The objective of this manuscript is to describe the re-
sults of this proof-of-concept study to assess the feasibil-
ity and effectiveness of implementing the electronic data
capature and management system for contact tracing
through comparison with the standard paper-based sys-
tem for contact tracing.
Methods
Setting and participants
The study was conducted in Port Loko District, northern
Sierra Leone, and was a collaboration between the London
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM),
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) and International
Medical Corps (IMC), working closely with the District and
National Ebola Response Teams. In Port Loko District, the
overall technical supervision of surveillance and contact
tracing activities was managed by the World Health
Organization (WHO). The lead agency for the management
and supervision of surveillance activities including contact
tracing activities was Marie Stopes International until the
end of March 2015, and was taken over by GOAL Global
on April 1st 2015. UNFPA were responsible for the man-
agement and supervision of contact tracers.
Eligible study participants were all 26 Contact Tracing
Coordinators (CTCs) and 86 Contact Tracers (CTs) op-
erating in the District during the study period (April 13
to August 31, 2015). The list of eligible CTCs and CTs
was obtained from partners responsible for contact tra-
cing activities in the District.
Recruitment and informed consent
Written informed consent was obtained from eligible
CTCs and CTs who consented to take part in the study.
Consent was not required from individual Ebola contacts
as the smartphone app mirrored the existing paper-
based system. The only additional information collected
was to record the time of the first contact tracing visit.
Study definition - Ebola contact
The study definition of an Ebola contact was that used by
the Sierra Leone National Emergency Response Centre, i.e.
a person without any disease signs and symptoms who had
physical contact with an Ebola case (alive or dead) or the
body fluids of an Ebola case within the last three weeks.
Physical contact included sharing the same room/bed,
caring for a patient, touching body fluids, or closely partici-
pating in a burial [31]. An Ebola contact was defined as a
listed1 contact of a laboratory-confirmed Ebola case in Port
Loko District diagnosed during the study period.
The line listing of Ebola contacts was undertaken
using the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Ebola
Virus Disease Contact Line Listing form. This was done
by the CIT and involved asking household members of
the Ebola case to report on the individuals that the
Ebola case had come into contact with that met the
definition used by the Sierra Leone National Emergency
Response Centre. Data on each person who had contact
with the Ebola case (Ebola contacts) was collected,
including their name, demographic and location infor-
mation, date of last contact with the Ebola case, type of
contact, head of household and contact details. The ini-
tial line list was then updated once the suspected or
probable Ebola case was confirmed by the laboratory.
Once the Ebola case was confirmed, contact tracing of
the line listed contacts started.
Original study design
The original design was a two-arm cluster-randomised trial
to be conducted in all 11 Chiefdoms of Port Loko District.
The Chiefdoms were randomised in a 5:6 allocation ratio to
receive one of the following: i) Control arm: standard
paper-based contact tracing system, involving CTCs operat-
ing at Chiefdom level within the District, together with a
team of CTs based in villages throughout the Chiefdom
using a paper-based system supplemented by ad-hoc phone
calls and SMS messaging for contact tracing of contacts of
confirmed Ebola cases ii) Intervention arm: the CTCs and
their CTs were provided with smartphones installed with
the Ebola Contact Tracing (ECT) app (Fig. 1). CTCs and
CTs were trained and supported to use this system. The
trial started on April 13, 2015, with the intervention intro-
duced in 6 randomly selected Chiefdoms and ongoing
paper-based data collection in the remaining 5 Chiefdoms.
Modified study design
Due to the small number of Ebola cases, the design was
changed on June 8, 2015 to a proof-of-concept study in
order to introduce the app to all 11 Chiefdoms in the
District. This decision was taken to maximise the data
collected using the app given the small number of new
Ebola cases and that these had occurred within a short
period of time. Following the recommendation of local
WHO staff, the paper-based system for contact tracing
1A listed contact is a contact who was line listed by the case
investigation team
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continued to be used alongside the ECT app as it was
the standard national system and was considered essen-
tial for surveillance. The date and time of the Ebola
confirmation for all cases was from the Public Health
England (PHE) laboratory in Port Loko District.
Qualitative methods
Qualitative methods formed part of a process evalu-
ation to evaluate the intervention. This included semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions
(FGDs) with district-level data entry and management
staff, CTCs and CTs on their use of mobile technology
prior to the study, use of the smartphone app for
contact tracing, training and ideas for improvements
to the app. Semi-structured interview schedules and a
topic guide were developed that addressed key areas in
relation to the study objectives, study operation, im-
plementation and delivery. The semi-structured
interviews and focus group discussions were con-
ducted in either English or Krio and were audio
recorded.
Development and testing of the Ebola contact tracing
(ECT) app
The intervention (“ECT app”) was a customised three-
tier smartphone application developed using Dimagi’s
CommCare platform [32], an open-source mobile
platform for electronic data capture and case manage-
ment. It was developed from February–April 2015 by a
developer in the USA (SQ) working with the study
team. The primary reasons for using CommCare were
i) its case management feature, which enables informa-
tion for an index Ebola case to be linked to multiple
contacts per case; and ii) the ability to share data on
the Ebola cases and their contacts between multiple
users (e.g. CTCs, CTs and the study team). The app
Fig. 1 Design of the Ebola Contact Tracing smartphone app study. Key. * The surveillance team goes back to the house of the suspected case to
obtain an updated list of contacts following laboratory confirmation. ** District Health Management Team. # Viral Hemorrhagic Fever. † Contact
Tracing Coordinators visit the DHMT six days a week (Monday to Saturday). $ Ebola Contact Tracing
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was pre- and pilot tested, and refined iteratively before
deployment in mid-April 2015. Due to the timeline,
app structure and feasibility of making technical
changes, not all required changes could be made to the
app, however, mitigating action was taken to overcome
these issues (Additional file 1: Table S1). The
smartphones were second-hand Android phones (4G
HTC MyTouch) donated by the UN Mission for Ebola
Emergency Response (UNMEER).
The app was developed following an assessment of the
structure of the contact tracing system in the District, and
discussions with national and local stakeholders including
the National Emergency Response Centre Surveillance
Pillar, the WHO Country Office, the Port Loko District
Health Management Team (DHMT), stakeholders from
the DERC, District Council, US Centers for Disease
Control, WHO (Port Loko), Marie Stopes International,
UNFPA and GOAL Global (Additional file 2).
Phased introduction of the ECT app
A phased introduction of the intervention (the ECT app)
was formally approved by the Sierra Leone Ministry of
Health and Sanitation and the WHO (Freetown national
office) on February 9, 2015. This involved pilot testing
the intervention in one ‘low risk’ Chiefdom (with no
confirmed Ebola cases within the previous 21 days) from
March 5–10, comprising a 2-day training workshop and
a 4-day simulation exercise. Following feedback and revi-
sions to the app, a second pilot test was conducted from
March 16–18. The results were presented to stake-
holders, and authorisation was granted to phase in the
intervention.
Study training
The main study training was on April 14–24, 2015 for
all 26 CTCs from the 11 Chiefdoms. This included an
initial half-day of training on the study design and use of
the paper DRF for contact tracing. Those in the inter-
vention arm Chiefdoms had a further 2.5 days training
after the initial training on use of the smartphone and
ECT app. This training was prior to the modified design
of a proof-of-concept study. Training for CTCs from the
control arm Chiefdoms subsequently included in the
proof-of-concept study took place from June 9–20. Prior
to this training, the paper-based system was the sole
contact tracing system in the control Chiefdoms.
Data analysis
The data collected via the app was stored on a central
server on CommCareHQ and exported into Excel and
checked before being transferred to Stata version 14 for
data management. Data from the paper-based DRFs
were entered into Excel, and exported to Stata for data
management. Descriptive analyses were used to estimate
the duration from laboratory confirmation of an Ebola
case to time of first visit to any one of their contacts
monitored using the app or paper, and the median dur-
ation of each step of the chain (confirmation of Ebola
case to Ebola case registration, to Ebola contact assign-
ment by CTCs using the app, to first visit by the CT;
Table 1). Results were summarised by case, and also
over all the contacts to give equal weight to each con-
tact, as the number of contacts per case varied
substantially.
Qualitative data were translated and transcribed into
English. All data were anonymised and any identifying
information was removed prior to the analysis. The data
was then analysed using thematic analysis to identify,
analyse and report patterns (themes) from the data using
NVivo software [33]. A six-step approach was under-
taken for the thematic analysis as described by Braun
and Clarke (2006) [33].
Ethics
Ethics approval was received from The London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Observational/Interventions
Research Ethics Committee (reference 8749–01) and the
Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee
(SLESRC). The study received clearance and support from
the Republic of Sierra Leone Ministry of Health and Sani-
tation, and the National Ebola Response Centre Surveil-
lance Pillar (responsible for Ebola contact tracing and
monitoring activities nationally).
Results
Ebola cases
Of the 43 EVD cases identified during the study period, the
contacts of 25 were monitored only using the standard
paper-based system for contact tracing (“paper-based
cases”). Contacts of the remaining 18 cases were also
monitored on the ECT app (“app-based cases”). The cases
were confirmed between the 13th April and 17th July 2015.
The median age of paper-based and app-based cases was
26 years (interquartile range (IQR) 20–44) and 29 years
(IQR 18–40), respectively (Table 2). Approximately half the
cases were female (60% for the paper-based cases and 50%
for the app-based cases; p = 0.52). All but one of the paper-
based cases were from one Chiefdom. The 18 app-based
cases were distributed across 5 Chiefdoms (Table 2).
Contacts of Ebola cases
A total of 408 contacts were identified for the 25 paper-
based cases (“paper-based contacts”) (average 16 per
case), and 646 contacts for the 18 app-based cases
(“app-based contacts”) (average 36 per case). The age
and sex distribution of contacts were similar by type of
case (Table 2).
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Standard paper-based system for contact tracing
The paper DRF was returned for the contacts of only
9 of the 25 paper-based cases (36.0%) and for 157 of
the 408 contacts of these cases (38.5%) at the end of
the study period. The data collected were of poor
quality, including errors on the forms (including miss-
ing or obviously incorrect time of first visit, Ebola
case IDs and dates of first and last visit). A common
error was that the time of contact visit reported by
the CT on the DRF was reported as prior to the la-
boratory confirmation of the index case for 63 (40%)
of the paper-based contacts. Among the remaining 94
contacts with completed forms, the median duration
from laboratory confirmation of the Ebola case to
first reported contact visit by the CT was 16.9 h (IQR
15.9–61.8 h). Fewer than half of the contacts (n = 43,
44%) were reported to have been monitored for the
full 21 days.
Table 1 Features and functionality of the Ebola Contact Tracing (ECT) App
ECT Module Purpose System features and advantages over paper-based system
Registration by Data Co-
ordinator at District level
Registration of data for confirmed Ebola case and all
listed contacts
• Built-in validation features (improves data accuracy e.g.
unique ID, number of digits for phone numbers and
mandatory fields e.g. age, sex)
• Skip logic and mandatory data entry ensures only relevant
questions are answered
• Automatic repeat information features (e.g. same address
details of case and contacts) reduces time
• Additional contacts feature (ease of adding additional
contacts to app saves time
• Password-secured (ensures confidentiality of Ebola cases and
contacts)
• District level monitoring (improve monitoring at district
level)
Contact assignment by
Contact Tracing Co-ordinator
at Chiefdom level
Assignment of listed contacts by CTC to a particular
Contact Tracer (CT) in a Chiefdom
(CTC is geographically mobile and can assign from
anywhere where there is an active data connection)
• Real-time data transmission to CT (reduces interval before
contact monitoring)
• Limited contact information view (View only contacts for a
specific Chiefdom improves confidentiality and accuracy
• Named CT assignment feature (reduces chances of
assignment error)
• Reassignment feature (enables contacts to be easily re-
assigned if misassigned)
• Pre-loaded contact information (minimises errors as no
further data entry required)
• Swipe system for contact assignment (minimises reliance on
typing/ reduce data entry error)
• Multiple contact assignment feature (enables contacts to be
assigned to one or more CTs)
Visitation by Contact Tracer
(CT) at community level
To enable the CT to monitor the listed contacts
assigned to them for a 21 day period or until the
contact becomes symptomatic
• Real-time information transmission (reduces time-lag for the
start of contact monitoring)
• Pre-loaded information on assigned contacts received
(eliminates data re-entry/reduces data entry errors)
• Automatic GPS location tracker (enables monitoring of
where data entry on the app took place)
• Automatic date and time capture (enables monitoring of CT
performance and reduces data misreporting)
• Offline data entry (mobile platform permits offline data entry
– contact monitoring can be entered offline/reduces
reliance on good network coverage)
• Repeat visits information can be entered (repeat contact visit
information can be entered and automatically uploaded
with immediate data storage once synced)
• Password secured data (ensures confidentiality and data
security)
• Additional data feature (e.g. on food availability) can be sent
to the district for improved care and coordination.
Telerivet Alert Line To alert the district Ebola Response Centre of
symptomatic contacts identified by the CT during the
contact visitation step
• Real-time district alert of symptomatic contacts (enables
quick dispatch of surveillance team and potentially reducing
the time to isolation
• Password secured data (ensures confidentiality)
• Reduced reliance on phone calls or SMS messages (ensures
all symptomatic contacts are accurately logged)
Key: CTC Contact Tracing Coordinator; CT Contact Tracer; GPS Global Positioning System; SD Secure Digital; SIM Subscriber Identity Card; SL Sierra Leone; SMS
Short Message Service
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Influence of training on paper-based contact tracing
One Ebola case was confirmed the day before training
started, and served as an example case during training.
The quality of paper-based contact tracing data for this
case was higher than for subsequent paper-based cases.
For example, all forms for the 32 contacts of the case
were returned, and 31 of these had time-of-first-visit
data in line with the standard protocol of CTCs collect-
ing the list of contacts from the DHMT between 8 and
9 am each morning and contact visits being made
around midday. In contrast, for the 6 subsequent cases
from another Chiefdom, 65 contacts were all recorded
as having time-of-first-visit at 8.30 am (mainly on the
same day as each other) which according to the standard
protocol was not possible.
App-based reporting for contact tracing
Of the 18 app-based cases, 2 were ‘secret burials’2 and
were not laboratory-confirmed. For the 16 confirmed
app-based cases entered on the ECT app for contact
monitoring, 556 contacts were registered (Table 3). Of
these, 524 contacts were assigned by CTCs (94.2%) for
contact tracing, and 384 (62.5%) were visited. The 172
contacts who were not assigned or visited were from 5
different cases each from a different Chiefdom. The me-
dian time from laboratory confirmation to case registra-
tion on the ECT app was 18.0 h (IQR 12.1–30.0), from
case registration to contact assignment by CTCs was a
median of 23.4 h (IQR 3.5–46.1) and from median time
of contact assignment to median time of first visit by a
CT was 22.8 h (IQR 11.7–108.7; Table 3). Overall, the
median time from laboratory confirmation to first re-
corded visit by the CT was 70.2 h (IQR 61.9–124.5)
(equal weight per case). Key factors associated with the
delays are described in Table 3.
Table 4 summarises results at contact level. The me-
dian duration from contact registration on the ECT app
to assignment by CTCs was 4.33 h (IQR 1.4–47.5 h) but
the median duration from contact assignment to first re-
corded visit by CTs was 24.9 h (IQR 18.1–122.7 h). The
total median duration from the start of case registration
on the ECT app at the district to the first recorded visit
by the CT was 73.2 h (IQR 26.2–216.8 h) (equal weight
per contact). The median number of days monitored for
the 384 contacts was 10 days (IQR 5.5–16). This varied
by Chiefdom with one Chiefdom having a median re-
corded follow-up of just 3 days (IQR 1–4).
Qualitative results
Results from the process evaluation indicated that few
(< 5%) CTCs and CTs had previously used a smart-
phone but both CTCs and CTs preferred the ECT
app for contact tracing, reporting that it was faster
and more accurate to use than the paper-based sys-
tem. Reported advantages of the ECT app over the
paper-based system included the elimination of the
CTC’s travel time to receive the daily lists of contacts
from the District, the ability to monitor accurately
large numbers of contacts, and the relative ease of
transporting a phone compared with carrying paper
forms. Suggested improvements related to using the
app included the need for better network coverage
(outside the control of the study or even the Ministry
of Health and Sanitation); improved battery life and
quality of phones; the need for further training on
synchronising the data (“syncing”) between the phone
and the server; the need for increased compensation
Table 2 Characteristics of cases and contacts (13th April –
August 31st 2015)
Paper Daily Reporting Form ECT Smartphone App
Cases Contacts Cases Contacts
Characteristic N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Total 25a 408 18b 646
Age
< 5 yrs 4 (16%) 51 (13%) 2 (13%) 123 (19%)
5–14 yrs 2 (8%) 119 (29%) 2 (13%) 141 (22%)
15 – 44 yrs 13 (52%) 188 (47%) 9 (56%) 272 (42%)
≥ 45 yrs 6 (24%) 46 (11%) 3 (19%) 110 (17%)
Median (IQR) 26 (20–44) 18 (7–30) 28.5 (18–40) 20 (6–35)
Sex
Male 10 (40%) 205 (50%) 9 (50%) 317 (49%)
Female 15 (60%) 203 (50%) 9 (50%) 329 (51%)
Mortality status
Alive 21 (84%) 407c (100%) 11 (61%) 646 (100%)
Dead 4 (16%) – 7 (39%) –
Chiefdom
1 – – 5 (28%) 72 (11%)
2 24 (96%) 376 (92%) 4 (22%) 70 (11%)
3 – – – 10d (2%)
4 – – 1 (6%) 65 (10%)
5 – – 5 (28%) 159 (25%)
6 – – 3 (17%) 270 (42%)
7 1 (4%) 32 (8%) – –
aFour cases followed using the paper Daily Reporting Form had no contacts
b Data on age and sex were available for only 16 cases (not for two
‘secret burials’)
c Data on 407 contacts was available. All contacts were alive
dThe 10 contacts in this Chiefdom came from a case that occurred in
Chiefdom 2
2Secret burials are burials that were conducted without the knowledge
of the health authorities and those involved in the safe management of
dead bodies and burials of patients who died from suspected or
confirmed Ebola virus disease. Deceased individuals buried through
secret burials were often buried by family/friends and community
members and were therefore not tested for Ebola virus disease.
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Table 3 Time from laboratory confirmation to first visit for the 16 confirmed cases, plus two secret burials
Case Chiefdom Contacts
registered
(N)
Contacts
visited
(N)
Date/time
of case
confirmation
Case
confirmation
to
registration
(hours)
Case
registration to
contact
assignment
(median hours)
Contact
assignment
to first visit
(median
hours)
Case
confirmation
to first visit
(median
hours)
Case-specific delaying
factors and comments
Total 556 384 18.0 23.4 22.8 70.2
1 1 19 19 06/06/2015
19:23
19.99 29.73 22.77 72.56 ● Remote location of
contacts
● Limited network coverage
● Network coverage and
syncing problems
● Battery charging issues
2 1 9 9 06/06/2015
22:18
43.89 3.16 23.12 70.16
3 1 9 9 07/06/2015
06:27
9.25 3.58 49.07 61.89
4 1 11 11 09/06/2015
23:10
16.52 1.68 21.77 39.94
5 2 24 24 13/06/2015
15:20
27.13 46.17 26.69 99.74 ● Remote Chiefdom
● Several cases occurring in
close proximity and time to
each other
● Technical difficulties
assigning contactsa
● Far from place where
phones could be charged
6 2 14 14 17/06/2015
15:13
2.61 13.14 108.75 124.47
7 2/3 36 34 18/06/2015
15:58
42.75 4.53 22.47 67.05
8 2 6 6 24/06/2015
17:10
3.55 11.36 3.83 18.73
9 4 24 15 29/06/2015
21:06
16.05 70.28 1.39 87.72 ● Technical difficulties
assigning contactsa
● Transport difficulties for
CTs led to CTC monitoring
with paper formb
10 4 120 98 16/06/2015
22:54
11.43 81.05 128.26 251.97
11 5 52 52 12/07/2015
14:26
19.57 2.88 5.35 27.81 ● Long contact lists
● Contacts added after
initial entry and assignment
● Long CT travel distances
● Management error in CT
assignmentc
● WHO intervention
including CTCs and CTs
having to monitor additional
non-quarantined households
d
● Monitoring issues for CTs
e
● Syncing and network
connectivity difficulties
● Technical problemsf
● Misplaced phones
Battery charging issues
12 5 23 23 14/07/2015
11:10
21.96 29.25 18.13 69.31
13 5 5 5 17/07/2015
15:01
30.95 23.43 11.7 66.08
14 6 112 51 25/06/2015
21:11
14.28 26.83 122.75 163.56 ● CTC user error in
assignment requiring
retraining and support
● System errors with
monitoring features.
(Rectified for later cases)
15 6 92 14 02/07/2015
17:21
16.08 76.95 275 296.54
16 5 0 0 18/06/2015
21:26
59.51 ● No contacts registered
Secret
burial
1
1 24 24 3.21 89.37 ● Syncing delays or network
problems
● Late reassignment of
contacts
Secret
burial
2
6 66 0 59.32 ● Inaccessible due to
flooding
Footnotes
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to offset phone charging fees (due to decreased bat-
tery life of the donated second–hand phone batteries
due to some CTCs and CTs charging their phones
using alternative methods of removing and charging
the phone battery only using ‘charging pegs’ at tele-
centres (charging booths) instead of taking the entire
phone for charging); better strategies for overcoming
distances to charging booths; and more refresher
training for contact tracing and monitoring using the
study phones.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study to attempt to esti-
mate the time to first contact visit from confirmation of an
Ebola case for contact tracing using an app- compared with
paper-based system. Our findings demonstrate proof-of-
concept that an electronic system for data capture and
management can improve data completeness and accuracy
of Ebola contact tracing and monitoring through improved
data completeness and monitoring. However, the study also
illustrated the challenges of conducting high-quality contact
tracing in an emergency setting [2, 5, 9, 34].
Previous studies comparing paper-based methods of
data collection with electronic methods have tended to
show the electronic method was superior [17, 35]. Our
study showed that advantages of the app over the
paper-based system included a more accurate, timely,
and permanent record of information, and improved
data completeness, quality and security. The challenges
in collecting high-quality data using a paper-based sys-
tem was shown by the poor quality of this data.
Operational requirements needed to introduce effect-
ive mobile-based contact tracing/monitoring during an
Ebola epidemic include effective coordination with
technical partners, understanding the structure of the
evolving contact tracing and monitoring process in
real-time, accessing study hardware and software, and
the technical expertise to design, develop, pilot and
deploy the app during the epidemic. The results are
applicable to other low-income settings that face simi-
lar geographical and infrastructural conditions.
One key finding was the long interval between Ebola
case and contact registration and first visit by the CT
when using the ECT app. This was, on average, longer
than the interval for the paper-based cases that pre-
dated the introduction of the app, though the data are
not fully comparable and may be partly due to the
highly-clustered nature of Ebola cases and their
contacts, in space and time, with the addition of new
contacts several days after the initial laboratory con-
firmation of the case increasing the duration between
registration and first visit. The need to adhere to
national protocols meant that a parallel approach of
using both paper and the app was in place, which may
have affected the efficiency and accuracy of the app-
based method. The duration could have potentially
been shortened through technical improvements in the
system (e.g. batch assignment of contacts rather than
single assignment of each contact by a CTC to one or
more CTs), but these were impractical due to the
underlying technical structure of the app. Other causes
reflect structural limitations of mHealth approaches in
certain settings (including poor network coverage).
a This included difficulties in basic app functions including switching on mobile data to use the app, syncing difficulties to receive and send contacts
b CTs experienced difficulties traveling to monitor contacts so the CTC monitored the contacts, but as the app on the CTC phone was for assignment and not
monitoring, the CTC used the paper form for monitoring
c CTCs often incorrectly assigned to a named Chiefdom level feature which showed on the page of named CTs to assign to. This was a technical feature of the
app that could not be hidden which meant that the contact was not monitored by the correct CT
d Extra responsibilities were placed on CTs in this Chiefdom to also conduct monitoring of non-quarantined homes due to a spike in cases in this Chiefdom. This
was on the advice of WHO
e This included transportation issues of CTs to monitor contacts, syncing issues, network connectivity difficulties and technical problems, misplaced phones,
battery charging issues that were specific to this Chiefdom when there were cases
f Technical problems related to the study phones included syncing issues to receive and send information to the CommCare server, software error messages, and
corrupt SD card problems that caused the app to not work
Table 4 Duration of each step from case registration to first visit of each contact, using the ECT app
Step N Median Min 25% 75% Max
Time from case registration to contact assignment 556 25.6 h 0.1 0.5 30.6 147.2
Time from contact registration to contact assignment 524a 4.33 h 0.2 1.4 47.5 292.5
Time from contact assignment to first recorded visit 384b 24.9 h 0.4 18.1 122.7 304.3c
Total time from start of case registration to first recorded visit 384 73.2 h 4.6 26.2 216.8 384.9
Footnotes:
a For 32 contacts, there was no record of assignment
b For 140 contacts, there was no record of a visit at home
c The 127 contacts with a duration of over 100 h were contacts of 4 cases. For one case, the long duration was due to syncing and network problems experienced
by the CT. The SIM card had to be changed to a different network. For another, the CTC was not able to assign the contacts correctly as they found it difficult to
assign the unusually large number of contacts and required assistance from the field team on the process. This led to contacts having to be reassigned. Specific
field team training on monitoring assigned contacts in the CommCare HQ was not provided until July – after the major assignment problems had occurred
Danquah et al. BMC Infectious Diseases          (2019) 19:810 Page 9 of 12
Strengths and limitations of the ECT app-based system
A key challenge was the complexity of designing and
implementing an app-based system in an emergency
context. Few studies have attempted to design and
evaluate a mHealth intervention during an epidemic. It
was necessary to minimise any risk to the existing
paper-based system, and steps taken to mitigate this risk
included the phased introduction of the ECT app and
continued use of the paper-based DRF alongside the app
as recommended by technical partners.
The major strength of the app-based system was the cre-
ation of a more accurate, timely, and permanent record of
information stored in a centralised data management and
data storage system in the main CommCare HQ. The sys-
tem allowed for the real-time transfer of information to
CTCs and CTs once the Ebola case and contacts were reg-
istered at the District level. The app-based system had in-
built validation and mandatory data entry fields to improve
data entry and data accuracy. Other strengths of the app-
based system were the reduction in data entry work, im-
proved data security, data sharing, and monitoring of CTC
and CT activity with the production of key performance
data. For example, the paper-based system meant CTs had
to carry large volumes of paper to monitor contacts. Fur-
ther, additional contacts could be easily added to the app-
based system and assigned for contact tracing. This reduced
the need for travel by CTCs to the DHMT offices to collect
the Ebola contact line list, which was the daily process for
the standard paper-based system. Findings from the quali-
tative results found that CTCs and CTs preferred to use
the app over the paper-based system for contact tracing.
We were unable to test our original trial hypothesis
that the app reduced the time from confirmation-to-visit
by the CT as the data quality for the paper-based system
was inadequate for this estimation. However, the dur-
ation for some app-based steps were longer than antici-
pated, reflected the multiple challenges (Table 3). For
example, the time from confirmation-to-registration on
the ECT app (median 18 h) reflected the standard proto-
col whereby the surveillance teams had to revisit the
home of the Ebola case to review and, where necessary,
revise the contact list after case confirmation and subse-
quent delays in receiving the new updated list of con-
tacts back to the district level. This was also meant to
occur for the paper-based system; however, this protocol
was not always followed.
One challenge in using the app was assignment of long
lists of Ebola contacts. This was due to a technical fea-
ture related to the app that resulted in errors in assign-
ment that potentially contributed to a time delay.
Further issues included the time-consuming assignment
of long lists of Ebola contacts to multiple CTs, some of
whom did not have their ECT app-installed smartphones
switched on, or who may having forgotten how to use
the app if there was a long delay between assignments.
Steps to mitigate this included giving CTs pocket-sized
instructions on key steps on the use of the app, field
support from a study monitor and refresher training.
The average number of Ebola contacts for the paper-
based system was lower than that for the app-based
system (16 contacts per case compared with 36 contacts
per case). The paper-based contact line listing was
undertaken before contact tracing started, so the differ-
ence in the average number of Ebola contacts per case
is unlikely to be due to the method used, but may re-
flect the varying number of contacts of Ebola cases over
time and the high degree of clustering in time and
space. Further, surveillance activities were enhanced in
the district in June, which may have increased the num-
ber of contacts identified per case. The increased num-
ber of contacts per case during the app-system period
may also reflect the increased duration from registra-
tion-to-first-visit by the CTs for the app-based versus
paper-based system. The majority of cases with longer
confirmation-to-visit times were from Chiefdoms with
multiple contacts per case and this may have affected
the process e.g. through manual errors in assigning
contacts and system errors with monitoring features.
Other challenges included poor network coverage and
technical challenges (e.g. corrupted memory cards and
software errors), short battery life and charging issues
and the time lag between the training and emergence of
real Ebola cases and contacts for monitoring. Mitigating
action included testing the phones before deployment
and providing CTCs and CTs with spare phones/batter-
ies, power banks for charging and changing the network
provider (Additional file 1: Table S1).
Developing an app during an epidemic had additional
challenges, including the speed with which the app needed
to be developed, limited time for pre- and pilot testing due
to the pressure to respond quickly to the emergency and
difficulties in updating app design and technical features
after deployment. The complex design structure of the
contact tracing system had to be reflected in the technical
design of the app platform. Mitigating action to overcome
these issues included simulated testing of Ebola cases and
contacts to test the system, further refresher training and
training and the development of strategies to reduce issues
related to the difficulties with the app design (some of
which are listed in Additional file 1: Table S1).
Strengths and limitations of the paper-based system
The main strength of the paper-based system was the use
of a simple method of data collection. However, our study
was motivated by recognised challenges in this system, in-
cluding in-built delays such as the physical collection of
forms from the DHMT each morning (a round trip of
approximately 5–6 h depending on the Chiefdom). The
Danquah et al. BMC Infectious Diseases          (2019) 19:810 Page 10 of 12
geographical challenges particular to Port Loko District
and the challenges for surveillance activities have been re-
ported by others involved in surveillance activities in the
District [36].
Our study identified major problems with i) data ar-
chiving of the standard paper-based system, with the
majority of contact tracing forms not being returned to
the DHMT at the end of the monitoring period; and ii)
data quality, with missing and inaccurate information.
However, contact tracing may have sometimes been
conducted more efficiently than the recorded data im-
plied - for example, direct reports by phone circumvent-
ing the paper-based system. This may have improved
the time-to-first-visit using the paper-based system but
not improved the app-based system as the timings for
the app-based system were automatically generated.
Recommendations to improve contact tracing
i) Addressing human resource issues is key especially the
dissatisfaction with the level of financial reimbursement
for the role, travel to often remote locations and hostility
from local communities. These personnel challenges
have been reported in other studies on Ebola contact
tracing [2, 5, 7–10, 36].
ii) Improved monitoring and evaluation including
stronger technical oversight of contact tracing activities
and improved monitoring of CTs in particular to moni-
tor their contact tracing activities and improved strat-
egies to obtain DRFs, for example, setting specific days
that DRFs should be returned to the District, and incen-
tives/rewards for timely and complete data submission.
iii) For the paper-based system, we recommend that
future improvements should address operational delivery
issues of the paper-based system including, improved fil-
ing, data archiving and data entry systems, and greater
co-ordination between organisations involved.
iv) For the app-based system, a two-tier system
from registration at the District to visitation by the
CT, rather than our three-tier structure would have
been preferable, as the long delays were often
between contact assignment to first visit. Our moni-
toring showed that the assignment stage presented
major problems, even though CTCs were trained and
received refresher training on this stage. One of the
considerable constraints of the app-based system was
trying to match to a paper-based system. A complex
system created with paper and voice communication
in mind can be difficult to replicate using the consist-
ent logic required by software.
Other recommendations would include use of an in-
country app design team where possible, further support
on the technical aspects of the design, and high-quality
(not second-hand) phones.
Conclusion
This study illustrates the complexities, challenges and op-
portunities of implementing an app-based system for epi-
demic contact tracing and monitoring. Despite these
challenges, this proof-of-concept study shows that imple-
menting mHealth applications even in a low-connectivity
and low-resource environment like rural Sierra Leone is
possible, even in an emergency. Having more time to de-
velop and test the app and conduct training workshops in a
non-emergency setting should result in a more comprehen-
sive and successful app that could be further integrated
with the national health system.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Table S1. Key monitoring issues/challenges identified
with the ECT app. (DOCX 26 kb)
Additional file 2: The Ebola Contact Tracing (ECT) app. (PDF 644 kb)
Abbreviations
App: Application; CDC: Centers for Disease Control; CIT: Case Investigation
Team; CT: Contact Tracer; CTCs: Contact Tracing Coordinators; CTs: Contact
Tracers; DERC: District Ebola Response Centre; DHMT: District Health
Management Team; DRF: Daily Reporting Form; ECT app: Ebola Contact
Tracing application; ECT: Ebola Contact Tracing; FGDs: Focus Group
Discussions; GIZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GmbH; GPS: Global Positioning System; IDs: Identifications; IMC: International
Medical Corps; IPA: Innovations for Poverty Action; IQR: Interquartile Range;
LSHTM: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine; mHealth: Mobile
Health; PHE: Public Health England; RSLAF: Republic of Sierra Leone Armed
Forces; SD: Secure Digital; SIM: Subscriber Identity Card; SL: Sierra Leone;
SLESRC: Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee; SMS: Short
Message Service; SQ: Saira Qureshi; TB: Tuberculosis; UNFPA: United Nations
Population Fund; UNMEER: United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency
Response; US: United States; WHO: World Health Organization
Acknowledgments
The study received the support and would like to extend thanks to the
Ministry of Health and Sanitation, the District Health Management Team
(Port Loko), the Ebola Response Centre Teams at national and local levels in
Sierra Leone, the WHO Freetown Office, WHO Port Loko Field Coordinators
and Epidemiology support leads, the Surveillance Pillar, GOAL, Marie Stopes,
UNFPA (Sierra Leone), CDC, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
(RSLAF) and Public Health England (PHE). We would also like to thank
UNMEER for the donation of the study phones, IPA Sierra Leone staff, IMC
staff and all the contact tracing coordinators and contact tracers that
participated in this study and Rachel Miles from LSHTM for providing
administrative support.
Authors’ contributions
LOD drafted the manuscript and finalised it with HAW NH MM FEC FM AT AJ
DAR provided feedback on the manuscript. LOD NH MM FEC FM AT AJ DAR
HAW designed the study. LOD oversaw data collection and worked with FEC
and FM in country to collect the data. LOD, NH, MM, FEC, FM, AT, DAR and
HAW contributed to the development of the mobile application. HAW led
the statistical analysis with contributions from LOD and NH. LOD analysed
the qualitative data. All authors have read and approved the final
manuscript.
Funding
This study was funded by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. The funder was not involved in the design,
collection, analysis and interpretation of the data and writing of this
manuscript. HAW received support in part from a grant from the Medical
Danquah et al. BMC Infectious Diseases          (2019) 19:810 Page 11 of 12
Research Council (MRC) and the Department for International Development
(DFID UK) under the MRC/DFID Concordat (K012126/1).
Availability of data and materials
The datasets analysed during the current study are available in the LSHTM
data repository https://datacompass.lshtm.ac.uk/1069/
Ethics approval and consent to participate
The London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine Observational/
Interventions Research Ethics Committee (reference 8749–01) and the Sierra
Leone Ethics and Scientific Review Committee (SLESRC) approved this study.
Written informed consent was obtained from eligible CTCs and CTs who
consented to take part in the study. Consent was not required from
individual Ebola contacts as the smartphone app mirrored the existing
paper-based system that was in use for contact tracing throughout the
country.
Consent for publication
Not applicable
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1School of Public Health, Faculty of Medicine, Imperial College London,
London, UK. 2MRC Tropical Epidemiology Group, Faculty of Epidemiology
and Population Health, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine,
London, UK. 3Innovations for Poverty Action, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
4Ministry of Health and Sanitation, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
Received: 29 November 2017 Accepted: 5 August 2019
References
1. 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa - Case Counts [http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/
ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html. Accessed 5 May 2016].
2. World Health Organization. Contact tracing during an outbreak of Ebola
virus disease. Geneva: WHO; 2014.
3. World Health Organization. Surveillance strategy during Phase 3 of the
Ebola response. Geneva: WHO; 2015.
4. Faye O, Boëlle P-Y, Heleze E, Faye O, Loucoubar C, Magassouba NF,
Soropogui B, Keita S, Gakou T, Bah EHI, et al. Chains of transmission and
control of Ebola virus disease in Conakry, Guinea, in 2014: an observational
study. Lancet Infect Dis. 2015;15(3):320–6.
5. McNamara LA, Schafer IJ, Nolen LD, Gorina Y, Redd JT, Lo T, Ervin E, Henao
O, Dahl BA, Morgan O, et al. Ebola Surveillance -Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
Leone. MMWR Suppl. 2016;65(Suppl-3):35–43.
6. Lokuge K, Caleo G, Greig J, Duncombe J, McWilliam N, Squire J, Lamin M,
Veltus E, Wolz A, Kobinger G, et al. Successful control of Ebola virus disease:
analysis of service based data from rural Sierra Leone. PLoS Negl Trop Dis.
2016;10(3):e0004498.
7. Ilesanmi OS. Learning from the challenges of Ebola virus disease contact
tracers in Sierra Leone, February, 2015. The Pan African Medical Journal.
2015;22(Suppl 1):21.
8. Greiner AL, Angelo KM, McCollum AM, Mirkovic K, Arthur R, Angulo FJ.
Addressing contact tracing challenges—critical to halting Ebola virus
disease transmission. Int J Infect Dis. 2015;41:53–5.
9. Olu OO, Lamunu M, Nanyunja M, Dafae F, Samba T, Sempiira N, Kuti-George
F, Abebe FZ, Sensasi B, Chimbaru A, et al. Contact tracing during an
outbreak of Ebola virus disease in the Western area districts of Sierra Leone:
lessons for future Ebola outbreak response. Front Public Health. 2016;4:130.
10. Sacks JA, Zehe E, Redick C, Bah A, Cowger K, Camara M, Diallo A, Gigo ANI,
Dhillon RS, Liu A. Introduction of Mobile health tools to support Ebola
surveillance and contact tracing in Guinea. Global Health: Science and
Practice. 2015;3(4):646–59.
11. Vital Wave Consulting. mHealth for development: the opportunity of mobile
technology for healthcare in the developing world. Washington D.C. and
Berkshire: UN Foundation - Vodaphone Foundation Partnership; 2009.
12. The World Bank. Information and Communications for Development 2012:
Maximizing Mobile. Washington DC: World Bank; 2012.
13. Mendoza, G, Levine, R, Kibuka, T, Okoko, L. mHealth Compendium, Volume
Four. Arlington: African Strategies for Health, Management Sciences for
Health; 2014
14. World Health Organization. mHealth: new horizons for health through
mobile technologies: second global survey on eHealth. Geneva: WHO; 2011.
15. Bastawrous A, Armstrong MJ. Mobile health use in low- and high-income
countries: an overview of the peer-reviewed literature. J R Soc Med. 2013;
106(4):130–42.
16. Aranda-Jan CB, Mohutsiwa-Dibe N, Loukanova S. Systematic review on what
works, what does not work and why of implementation of mobile health
(mHealth) projects in Africa. BMC Public Health. 2014;14:188.
17. Ha YP, Tesfalul MA, Littman-Quinn R, Antwi C, Green RS, Mapila TO, Bellamy
SL, Ncube RT, Mugisha K, Ho-Foster AR, et al. Evaluation of a Mobile health
approach to tuberculosis contact tracing in Botswana. J Health Commun.
2016;21(10):1115–21.
18. Steinhubl SR, Marriott MP, Wegerich SW. Remote sensing of vital signs: a
wearable, wireless “band-aid” sensor with personalized analytics for
improved Ebola patient care and worker safety. Global Health: Science and
Practice. 2015;3(3):516–9.
19. Mobile phones to help Ebola vaccine trials [http://www.scidev.net/global/
medicine/news/mobile-phones-ebola-vaccine-trials.html. Accessed 19 Mar 2017].
20. Jia K, Mohamed K. Evaluating the use of cell phone messaging for
community Ebola syndromic surveillance in high risked settings in southern
sierra Leone. Afr Health Sci. 2015;15(3):797–802.
21. IBM tech to fight Ebola in Africa [http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/
ibm-tech-fight-ebola-africa. Accessed 19 Mar 2017].
22. Otu A, Ebenso B, Okuzu O, Osifo-Dawodu E. Using a mHealth tutorial
application to change knowledge and attitude of frontline health workers
to Ebola virus disease in Nigeria: a before-and-after study. Hum Resour
Health. 2016;14:5.
23. African Strategies for Health. Technical Brief: Use of technology in the Ebola
response in West Africa: Arlington, VA; 2014.
24. Q&A: How technology is transforming Ebola response efforts [https://blog.
usaid.gov/2015/06/qa-how-technology-is-transforming-ebola-response-
efforts/. Accessed 19 Mar 2017].
25. USAID Learning Lab. The mHero Story: Adapting mobile technology to
support health systems strengthening amid the Ebola Outbreak; 2015.
26. Using mobile technology to improve maternal health and fight Ebola
[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/CTINigeria.pdf.
Accessed 19 Mar 2017].
27. Ratnayake R, Crowe SJ, Jasperse J, Privette G, Stone E, Miller L, Hertz D, Fu C,
Maenner MJ, Jambai A, et al. Assessment of community event-based
surveillance for Ebola virus disease, Sierra Leone, 2015. Emerg Infect Dis.
2016;22(8):1431–7.
28. Steinhubl SR, Muse ED, Topol EJ. The emerging field of mobile health. Sci
Transl Med. 2015;7(283):283rv283.
29. Hall CS, Fottrell E, Wilkinson S, Byass P. Assessing the impact of mHealth
interventions in low- and middle-income countries – what has been shown
to work? Glob Health Action. 2014;7.
30. Tomlinson M, Rotheram-Borus MJ, Swartz L, Tsai AC. Scaling up mHealth:
where is the evidence? PLoS Med. 2013;10(2):e1001382.
31. Ministry of Health and Sanitation Sierra Leone: Sierra Leone emergency
management programme standard operating procedure for contact tracing
version#1. 2014.
32. CommCare [http://www.dimagi.com/products/. Accessed 24 Feb 2016].
33. Braun V, Clarke V. Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qual Res Psychol.
2006;3(2):77–101.
34. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, World Health Organization:
Emergency guideline for the implementation and management of contact
tracing for Ebola virus disease. 2015.
35. Labrique AB, Vasudevan L, Kochi E, Fabricant R, Mehl G. mHealth innovations
as health system strengthening tools: 12 common applications and a visual
framework. Global Health: Science and Practice. 2013;1(2):160–71.
36. T Boland S, Polich E, Connolly A, Hoar A, Sesay T, Tran A-MA. Overcoming
operational challenges to Ebola case investigation in Sierra Leone. Global
Health: Science and Practice. 2017;5(3):456–67.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Danquah et al. BMC Infectious Diseases          (2019) 19:810 Page 12 of 12
